The sovereign-bank diabolic loop and ESBies by Brunnermeier, Markus K. et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1414 
March 2016 
The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies 
Markus K Brunnermeier, Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane, 
Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, Tano Santos,  
David Thesmar, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh,  
Dimitri Vayanos 
    
Abstract 
We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the 
diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. 
Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, 
such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally 
diversified sovereign portfolio known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more 
safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior 
tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free. 
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The “diabolic loop” between sovereign and bank credit risk was the hallmark of the 2009-
12 sovereign debt crisis in the periphery of the euro area. In Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain, the deterioration of sovereign creditworthiness reduced the market value of banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign debt. This reduced the perceived solvency of domestic banks
and curtailed their lending activity. The resulting bank distress increased the chances that
banks would have to be bailed out by their (domestic) government, which increased sovereign
distress even further, engendering a “bailout loop”. Moreover, the recessionary impact of the
credit crunch led to a reduction in tax revenue, which also contributed to weakening govern-
ment solvency in these countries, triggering a “real-economy loop”. These two concomitant
feedback loops are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Two Diabolic Loops. Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2011)
There are three ingredients to these feedback loops. First, the home bias of banks’
sovereign debt portfolios, which makes their equity value and solvency dependent on swings
in the perceived solvency and market value of their own government’s debt (Carlo Altavilla,
Saverio Simonelli and Marco Pagano, 2015). Second, the inability of governments to commit
ex-ante not to bailout domestic banks, since bailout is optimal once banks are distressed.
Third, free capital mobility, which ensures that international investors’ perceptions of future
government solvency – whether warranted by fiscal fundamentals or not – are incorporated
in the market value of domestic government debt. To break these loops, policy must remove
at least one of these three ingredients. So far, capital controls are the only policy remedy
adopted in response to the diabolic loop, in Cyprus and Greece.
In this paper we analyze the proposal by Brunnermeier et al. (2011), which aims to
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eliminate the diabolic loop by reducing the sensitivity of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios to
domestic sovereign risk. The proposal envisions that banks’ sovereign bond holdings would
consist mainly of the senior tranche of a well-diversified portfolio. This seniority structure
could be achieved via a simple securitization, whereby financial intermediaries use a well-
diversified portfolio of euro-area sovereign bonds to back the issuance of a senior tranche,
labeled “European Safe Bonds” (or ESBies), and a junior tranche, named “European Junior
Bonds” (or EJBies). ESBies would have very little exposure to sovereign risk, owing to the
“double protection” of diversification and seniority: relative to a simple diversified portfolio
of sovereign debt, ESBies would enjoy the additional protection provided by seniority, as the
impact of a sovereign default would be absorbed in the first instance by the junior tranche,
which would not be held by banks. This is an important feature, as the existence of a safe
asset is important for the conduct of monetary policy (Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov,
2015).
This paper shows that restricting euro-area banks to hold ESBies would effectively iso-
late banks from domestic sovereign risk, and thereby defuse the “diabolic loop” between
sovereign and bank credit risk. Interestingly, both features of ESBies – diversification and
seniority – are needed. On the one hand, the price of a diversified but not tranched sovereign
debt portfolio would still depend on swings in the perceived creditworthiness of euro area
governments, especially if they are correlated across countries due to a generalized “flight to
quality”. On the other hand, tranching the sovereign debt of an individual country does not
produce enough safe domestic securities in countries with weaker fiscal positions or limited
sovereign debt issuance. In contrast, performing the tranching on a large pool of imperfectly
correlated sovereign bonds would generate a large stock of an essentially risk-free euro-area
sovereign asset, the liquidity and safety of which would be attractive for both banks and
non-banks.
Last but not least, the issuance of such a security would not require any form of “fiscal
solidarity” among euro area governments: each government would remain entirely responsible
for its own solvency, and the market price of its debt would remain a signal of its perceived
solvency. This absence of joint liability stands in contrast to euro-bond proposals, such as
the blue-red bond proposal by Jakob Von Weizsa¨cker and Jacques Delpla (2011).
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1 One-Country Model
Consider a single country with stochastic tax revenue, resulting in a high or low primary
surplus. We show that a “sunspot-driven” repricing of the country’s sovereign risk can result
in bailouts of banks or other systemic financial institutions, which can lead to sovereign
default when the primary surplus turns out to be low. In the absence of such repricing,
the government never defaults. Effectively, the sunspot acts as a selection device among
two equilibria – one with bailout and possible default, and another with no bailout and no
default. A key condition for the first equilibrium to exist – and hence for the diabolic loop
to arise – is that banks hold a sufficiently large fraction of the stock of domestic sovereign
debt.
There are four domestic agents. First, the government, which prefers higher to lower out-
put, as this is associated with greater tax revenue. Second, dispersed depositors, which run
on insolvent banks if the government does not bail them out, and also pay taxes. Third, bank
equity holders, which use all of their capital for the initial equity, so they cannot recapitalize
banks subsequently. Finally, investors in government bonds, whose beliefs determine the
price of sovereign debt subject to a sunspot that may lead to repricing of sovereign risk. For
simplicity, all agents are risk neutral and there is no discounting, so that the risk-free interest
rate is zero. Short-term deposits yield extra utility compared to long-term government debt
due to their convenience value in performing transactions.1
The model has four dates: 0, 1, 2, 3. All consumption takes place at the final date 3.
At t = 0, the government issues a unit of a zero coupon bond at price B0 with face value
S > 0, which is repaid probabilistically in the last period. The government primary surplus
S (absent the diabolic loop) is low S with probability pi and high S > S with probability
1−pi. We denote by Bt the price of the bond at each date t. Next, we denote by α the share
of debt owned by banks in the original period, the remaining fraction 1 − α being held by
other risk-neutral investors. Hence, at time t = 0, banks hold αB0 in sovereign debt on the
asset side of their balance sheet, as well as an amount L0 of loans to the real economy. On
the liability side of their balance sheets are deposits D0 and equity E0.
At date t = 1 a sunspot occurs with probability p.2 When a sunspot is observed, investors
become pessimistic: they expect partial government default in the last period, which in
equilibrium will be a true belief. Hence, the price of the government bond drops from B0 to
1This is necessary to justify the demand for bank deposits backed by sovereign debt. Otherwise, banks
would not need to hold sovereign debt.
2The sunspot carries no fundamental information about the primary surplus revealed in t = 3.
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B1 and banks suffer marked-to-market capital losses of −α (B1 −B0).3 If this leads banks’
equity to drop below zero, banks are insolvent. We assume that insolvent banks cannot roll-
over maturing loans of size ψL0. This leads to an output loss, which lowers the government’s
tax revenue by τψL0 ≥ 0 at t = 3. At date t = 2 the government must decide whether to
bail out banks, before discovering its actual tax revenue at t = 3. A bailout involves the
issuance of additional government bonds, which are given to the banks as extra assets. If
the government chooses not to bailout, a further ψL0 of loans are not rolled-over, resulting
in even lower tax revenues at t = 3.
Finally, at date t = 3, the government’s fiscal surplus is realized. If no sunspot occurred,
the surplus is just the stochastic variable S, while if the sunspot occurred at t = 1 and a
bailout at t = 2, the surplus is S − τψL0 + α (B1 −B0) + E0 =: S − C, where C is the
implied (endogenous) bailout cost plus the tax loss due to credit crunch in t = 1.
We make four parametric assumptions. First, the government’s primary surplus before
bailout costs remains positive:
S − τψL0 ≥ 0. (A1)
Second, the bailout is assumed to be optimal at t = 2 if a sunspot occurred at t = 1, so that
a no-bailout pledge is not credible for any α. This requires:
E0 > [2pi(1− p)− 1] τψL0. (A2)
Third, banks’ aggregate equity is sufficiently small that the diabolic loop occurs at least if
exposure is maximal (α = 1):
E0 < (1− p) piτψL0. (A3)
Fourth, if the surplus is high, the government can still fully repay its debt even after a bailout
at t = 2 (even for α = 1):4
S − S ≥ τψL0 − E0
1− pi(1− p) . (A4)
The Diabolic Loop The diabolic loop occurs if the fraction of sovereign debt held by
banks exceeds a threshold or equivalently if banks’ equity is below a critical level. When
investors become pessimistic due to the sunspot, the price of sovereign debt drops, making
banks insolvent. This prompts the government to bail them out (by A2), which precipitates
3Note that even if banks’ asset were not marked to market, the diabolic loop would still arise if depositors
or other creditors panic as result of depreciation of banks’ assets.
4This assumption is only used to simplify calculations, but can easily be relaxed.
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default and justifies investors’ pessimism. (?) When the primary surplus at t = 3 is S,
after a bailout the government can only pay S − C. Therefore, the price of debt at t = 1 is
B1 = S − piC, so piC ≡ ∆1 is the price discount relative to its face value S. The price of
the debt in period 0 is the probability-weighted average of sunspot and no-sunspot prices:
B0 = S − pipC, with a price discount pipC ≡ ∆0 = p∆1. Recalling the definition of bailout
costs C and of prices B0 and B1, and noticing that B1 − B0 = −(1− p)∆1, the discount at
t = 1 is
∆1 = pi [τψL0 − α(B1 −B0)− E0] (1.1)
=
pi(τψL0 − E0)
1− αpi(1− p) .
Hence the bailout is avoided at t = 2 if banks are left with positive equity, i.e.,
α(B1 −B0) + E0 > 0 (1.2)
⇔ E0 > α(1− p)piτψL0 := E0,
where the equivalence follows from
B1 −B0 = − (1− p)pi
1− α(1− p)pi (τψL0 − E0). (1.3)
If instead banks’ equity is below the threshold E0 in (1.2), then the sunspot leads to the
diabolic-loop equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the price drop (1.3) is higher in absolute
value (i) the smaller bank equity E0, (ii) the larger the fraction α of sovereign debt held by
banks, (iii) the higher the probability pi of low fiscal surplus, and (iv) the smaller the sunspot
probability p (as a very unlikely sunspot is less priced in B0).
Hence, the diabolic loop can be avoided by requiring banks to meet the minimum equity
threshold E0, for a given size of their sovereign debt portfolio α. Equivalently, one can
impose on banks an aggregate position limit on government bonds α∗, given their initial
equity E0. The total supply of safe (diabolic-loop-free) assets to the banks is α
∗S, since
bonds are risk-free. This effectively limits the amount of safe deposits that the banking
system can generate.
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. (i) To avoid the diabolic loop, the ratio of bank equity to sovereign exposure
must be at least (1− p) pi τψL0
S
.
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(ii) The maximum amount of safe assets available to banks is α∗B0 = E0(1−p)piτψL0S. Equiva-
lently,
E0
αS
is the minimum ratio of aggregate bank equity to sovereign exposure.
Sovereign Debt Tranching We consider an alternative to an upper bound on bank
holdings of debt. Sovereign debt could be split into a senior and a junior tranche, with
banks permitted to hold only the senior tranche. We will show that the diabolic loop is
ruled out if the face value, F s, of the senior tranche (the tranching point) or the bank’s
senior tranche holdings, αs, is sufficiently low (for a given equity level E0) or equivalently,
E0 > E
s
0 := α
s(1− p)pi[τψL0− (S−F s)]). In other words, the diabolic loop equilibrium can
be ruled out by picking appropriate pairs (αs, F s). Tranching shrinks the region in which
the diabolic loop can occur: intuitively, this is because it shifts risk arising from sovereign
debt from banks to holders of the junior tranche. The analysis is the same as in the case of
no tranching except that C is replaced by Cs− (S−F s). Now, the cost of default Cs reflects
the price drop in the senior bond and the additional term −(S − F s) reflects the reduction
in bailout costs due to the additional protection provided by the junior tranche.
Insofar as tranching eliminates the risk of bailouts, it also makes the junior tranche risk
free as in this model the government may default only if it bails out the banks.
Tranching increases the total supply of safe assets, αsF s to the banking sector. To see
this, suppose banks increase their senior bond holdings, αs. This may expose them to the
diabolic loop. But by picking a lower face value F s one can still rule out the diabolic loop.
We show that the required decline in F s is small enough that αsF s, i.e. the total value of
safe assets, increases.
Stating these results formally:5
Proposition 2. (i) For a given security structure F s, to avoid the diabolic loop, the ratio
of banks’ aggregate equity to sovereign exposure must be at least (1− p) pi τψL0−(S−F s)
F s
, where
the term (S − F s) reflects the protection afforded by the junior tranche.
(ii) If E0 > E
s
0, the junior bond is also safe.
(iii) If F s is chosen, so as to maximize the amount of safe assets for the banking sector,
tranching generates larger amounts of safe assets than no tranching. Equivalently, tranching
lowers the equity to be held by banks per unit of sovereign exposure.
5The proof of this and the next proposition is relegated to an on-line appendix.
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2 Two-Country Model
Now consider two symmetric countries. The realizations of their primary surpluses absent
bailout interventions is independently distributed. Both governments issue zero coupon
bonds with face value S. If banks held only their own government sovereign bond, we would
effectively be in the single country case: sovereign default is only correlated to the extent that
sunspots are correlated. Suppose instead that an intermediary securitizes a symmetric pool
made of government bonds issued by the two countries. If banks rebalance their portfolios
slightly towards this pooled asset, they will be less exposed to a drop in the price of domestic
debt. So, they need less equity to avoid the diabolic loop. This is the benefit of pooling.
But, if banks in both countries replace their entire domestic sovereign holdings with the
pooled asset, all banks end up with identical portfolios. Now, repricing of sovereign debt
cannot occur in one country without occurring in the other. For bailout to occur in one of
the two countries, the repricing of its domestic debt should be large enough that the implied
price drop of the pooled asset would trigger insolvency of its domestic banks. But then, by
symmetry the banks of the other country are also insolvent, and require a bailout. Hence,
complete pooling leads to perfect contagion. This is the curse of pooling.
This illustrates an important insight: simply requiring banks to hold a pooled asset – or
an equivalently diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds – might actually lead to contagion
across countries, if it makes their sovereign debt portfolios very similar.
But contagion is contained if banks hold only the senior tranche, αE , of such a pooled
asset, i.e. ESBies. Pooling and tranching interact positively, since repricing of ESBies after
a sunspot is smaller than that of a senior bond of a single country. Intuitively, tranching
the pooled asset allows senior bond holders to push losses onto the junior bond holders
in a greater number of states than tranching the debt of a single country. Hence, banks’
equity requirements can be reduced. Still, the junior bond would be itself isolated from
repricing risk due to a sunspot: insofar as the diabolic loop is avoided, banks’ losses are an
off equilibrium phenomenon so that even junior bonds are risk-free.
Pooling and tranching enables a maximal supply of safe assets to banks. The logic is
the same as tranching in a single country but, when applied to pooled sovereign debt, the
(off-equilibrium) risk can be shifted more effectively to the junior bond holders. As a result,
tranching combined with pooling increases the supply of safe assets further. Proposition 3
states this formally.
Proposition 3. (i) Given the tranching point F E , ESBies lower the required ratio of equity
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to sovereign exposure compared to single country tranching (for αE = αs).
(ii) If this ratio is upheld, the junior bond is also safe.
(iii) If F E and αE are chosen so as to maximize the amount of safe assets for the banking
sector, ESBies generate a larger amount of safe assets than single country tranching.
3 Conclusion
This paper adds to a recent literature on the feedback loop between sovereign and bank
solvency risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2011, Obstfeld, 2013, Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl,
2014; Cooper and Nikolov, 2013, Farhi and Tirole, 2015; Leonello, 2014), by providing a
simple model and using it to explore whether and how the loop can be defused by restricting
banks’ portfolio of sovereign holdings.
First, we find that what matters is the ratio of banks’ equity to their domestic sovereign
exposures: the diabolic loop can equivalently be defused by raising banks’ equity require-
ments or by restricting their holdings of domestic sovereign debt.
Second, requiring banks to hold only a senior tranche of domestic sovereign debt is more
effective than requiring them to diversify their sovereign portfolios across countries.
Third, tranching is most effective if applied to a diversified sovereign debt portfolio:
requiring banks to hold only the senior tranche of such a portfolio – i.e. ESBies – reduces
their equity requirement per dollar of sovereign holdings, relative to a regime where they are
required to hold senior domestic sovereign debt only. Intuitively, the reason is that using both
pooling and tranching allows more of the sovereign risk generated by each government to be
shifted onto the junior bond-holders, hence away from the banks of the corresponding country
– thus eliminating the need for the government to intervene with a bailout. Accordingly,
we show that ESBies generate a larger amount of safe assets than domestic debt tranching
alone, if the split between senior and junior bonds is optimally designed.
Finally, insofar as ESBies succeed in defusing the diabolic loop and associate endogenous
risk, in equilibrium even the junior bond is risk-free.
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A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
To prove claim (i), note that if the space (αs, F s) is split into a subset in which the diabolic
loop occurs and one, N , in which it does not, identifying the boundary of N will enable
us to characterize the diabolic loop region. To do so, we compute senior bond prices under
the diabolic-loop equilibrium and require that the losses associated with the sunspot reduce
bank equity exactly to zero.
If the sunspot is not observed, debt trades at its no default-value S, and the same holds
for the senior tranche, which trades at F s. If the sunspot is observed and banks require a
recapitalization, the cost to the government is Cs ≡ τψL0 − α(Bs1 − Bs0) − E0, where Bst
denotes the price of the senior tranche. If the surplus at t = 3 is S, the government can
repay its debt in full after incurring the cost Cs because of A4, so that the senior tranche
pays its face value F s; if instead the surplus is S, the government can only pay S − Cs and
the senior tranche yields F s− [Cs−(S−F s)], where S−F s is the loss absorbed by the junior
tranche. Hence, the price of the senior tranche at t = 1 is Bs1 = F
s−pi[Cs−(S−F s)]. So the
analysis is the same as in the case of no tranching except that C is replaced by Cs−(S−F s).
This amounts to replacing τψL0 in Equation (1.2) by τψL0 − (S − F s). In other words, the
bailout is avoided if
E0 ≥ αspi(1− p) [τψL0 − (S − F s)] =: Es0. (4)
This proves claim (i).
Claim (ii) follows by noticing that a diabolic loop cannot occur if banks’ equity is E0 > E
s
0,
so that the junior bond is also risk-free.
To prove claim (iii) note that for pairs (αs, F s) on the boundary of the no-diabolic-loop
subset N , the inequality (4) holds with equality. The right-hand side of (4) is increasing in
both αs and F s, which means that at the boundary if banks hold a larger fraction of the
senior tranche αs, this tranche must have a lower face value F s, and vice versa. We want
to find the pair (αs∗, F s∗) ∈ N that maximizes the total value of safe assets available to the
banking system:
max
(αs,F s)∈N
αsF s = max
(αs,F s)∈N
E0F
s
pi(1− p) [τψL0 − (S − F s)] .
The maximand is decreasing in F s, because S > τψL0. Therefore, the maximization requires
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setting the optimal face value F s∗ at the lowest possible value that meets (4) with equality.
In turn, this requires setting αs at its upper bound αs∗ = 1, so that
F s∗ = S +
E0
pi(1− p) − τψL0 < S, (5)
where the inequality follows from A3. Since the solution for max(αs,F s)∈N αsF s differs from
the no-tranching solution, tranching allows the economy to generate a larger amount of safe
assets for the banking system. QED
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
As in the case where tranching occurs in a single country, we wish to characterize the set
N of pairs (αE , F E) that rule out the diabolic-loop equilibrium. To do so, we initially
compute prices of ESBies for a given (αE , F E) under a diabolic-loop equilibrium and require
that bank equity remains non-negative. Consider the parameter region in which the senior
tranche incurs losses when the (union-wide) sunspot is observed. There are two scenarios to
be considered:
First, suppose equity E0 is large enough that ESBies incur losses only in the worse-case
outcome at t = 3, in which both countries have primary surplus S realization. In this
scenario, which occurs with probability pi2, the pooled asset pays S − CE , and the senior
tranche pays F E−[CE−(S−F E)]. Hence, junior bond holders are wiped out. Clearly, ESBies
are better protected than a single country senior bond, where the low surplus realization
occurs with probability pi.
Second, for lower equity levels E0 the diabolic loop might be so large that ESBies might
incur losses if only one of the two countries has a low primary surplus realization. In this
case the pooled asset pays S− 1
2
CE and the junior bond holder will be wiped out in three of
the four possible surplus realizations. This case occurs with probability 2pi (1− pi).
In the first scenario, in which ESBies only default in the state where surplus realization
is S for both governments, the following inequality must hold
S − 1
2
CE ≥ F E . (6)
If (6) holds, then the price of the senior tranche in period 1 is BE1 = F
E −pi2[CE − (S−F E)].
The analysis is the same as in the one-country case with tranching except that pi is replaced
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by pi2. A recapitalization is not needed if
E0 ≥ αEpi2(1− p)
[
τψL0 − (S − F E)
]
. (7)
In the second scenario, where (6) is violated, if one country has surplus S and the other
S, the senior tranche receives F E − [1
2
CE − (S − F E)] and its price at t = 1 is
BE1 = F
E −
[
1
2
2pi(1− pi) + pi2
]
CE +
[
2pi(1− pi) + pi2] (S − F E)
= F E − pi [CE − (2− pi)(S − F E)] .
The analysis is the same as in the one-country case with tranching except that we must
replace S − F E by (2− pi)(S − F E). A recapitalization is not needed if
E0 ≥ αEpi(1− p)
[
τψL0 − (2− pi)(S − F E)
]
. (8)
Setting αE = αs and F E = F s in (7) and (8) and comparing them with (4), it follows that
the lower bound on equity to sovereign exposure ratio is less stringent with ESBies than with
single country tranching. This completes part (i) of the proof.
The claim in part (ii) follows directly from the Equations (7) and (8) which rule out the
diabolic loop equilibrium.
To prove the claim in part (iii), note that in the first scenario the pair (αE∗, F E∗) that
maximizes the value of the safe asset available to the banks satisfies (7) with equality, and
αE∗ = 1 by the same argument as in the one-country case. The resulting value of the senior
tranche is analogous to (5) in the one-country case with tranching:
F E∗ = S +
E0
pi2(1− p) − τψL0. (9)
Since pi is now replaced by pi2, we have F E∗ > F s∗: pooling and tranching generates a larger
supply of the safe asset than tranching in each country separately.
We must finally check that ESBies suffer no losses even in the next to worst-case scenario,
i.e. (6) is satisfied. Noting that
CE∗ = τψL0 − α(BE∗1 −BE∗0 )− E0 = τψL0 + αE∗(1− p)∆E∗1 − E0,
and that in the two-country case with tranching ∆E1 is given by an equation analogous to
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(1.1) where τψL0 is replaced by τψL0− (S−F E) and pi by pi2, the no-loss condition (6) can
be rewritten as
S − F E∗ − 1
2
[
τψL0 + α
E∗(1− p)pi
2(τψL0 − E0 − (S − F E∗))
1− αE∗pi2(1− p) − E0
]
≥ 0. (10)
We next set αE∗ = 1 and F E∗ equal to its value in (9). Because these values satisfy (7)
with equality, the sum of the second and third term in the square bracket of (10) is zero, so
using (9), (10) becomes
E0 ≤ 1
2
pi2(1− p)τψL0, (11)
which is part of the parameter space for E0 we consider under A3.
For the second scenario, in which (6) holds, going through the same steps as for the
first scenario, we find that the pair (αE∗, F E∗) that maximizes the value of safe investment
available to the banks satisfies αE∗ = 1 and
F E∗ = S − 1
(2− pi)
[
τψL0 − E0
pi(1− p)
]
. (12)
The face value F E∗ is larger than in the one-country case because by A3 the term in square
brackets is positive. We are in the second scenario, i.e. (6) is violated, if equity is in the
region
1
2
pi2(1− p)τψL0 < E0 < pi(1− p)τψL0.
QED
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